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4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Fred Fiske Show STATION WAMU-FM
DATE April 20, 1987 8:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT The Iranscam Dealings

BRUCE GELLERMAN [substitute host]: Nearly every day for the last six months we've been reading about what's come [to be] known as the Iranscam or Contragate, the arms-for-hostage deal between the United States and Iran, the profits being used to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. Just who knew what and when, especially what did President Reagan know, when did he know it, and what is still to be learned, is an unfolding drama which we expect we'll learn more about in coming months as the congressional inquiries begin.

With me tonight is a man who is well qualified to discuss the ongoing Iranscam dealings. He knows the innermost workings of the Iran government, and perhaps the CIA. He's Masur Rafizadeh. [Asides about pronunciation] He's the author of "Witness: From the Shaw to the Secret Arms Deal: An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran." He's the former chief of SAVAK.

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You were the former chief of U.S. SAVAK.

MASUR RAFIZADEH: U.S. SAVAK.

GELLERMAN: Now, there's a difference, yes?

RAFIZADEH: Sure.

GELLERMAN: What's the difference?

RAFIZADEH: The difference is there is one chief of SAVAK in Iran, and I was chief of SAVAK in the United States of America.

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GELLERMAN: Now, we've heard a lot about SAVAK. SAVAK, is that like our FBI, or what actually is SAVAK? What does it mean?

RAFIZADEH: SAVAK is FBI and CIA together.

GELLERMAN: The FBI -- so it's an internal...

RAFIZADEH: Internal and gathering intelligence from foreign countries.

GELLERMAN: And what was your job in the United States? What were you supposed to do? I know at the beginning it was innocent enough.

RAFIZADEH: My job was to gather intelligence about the people in the United States that were against the Shah, they were active against the Shah.

GELLERMAN: So you would take that information about students, businessmen, and send it back to the Shah.

RAFIZADEH: That's right.

GELLERMAN: And you were perfectly willing to do that. You had no qualms, no compunction.

RAFIZADEH: No, no, no, no. That's not the case. That was my job to -- that was my duty, but I didn't do that.

GELLERMAN: Before we get into that, what you did and what you didn't do, let me ask you -- you worked for the CIA.

RAFIZADEH: I worked for the CIA.

GELLERMAN: You worked for SAVAK.

RAFIZADEH: I worked for the SAVAK.

GELLERMAN: You're in the studio tonight.

RAFIZADEH: That's right.

GELLERMAN: And you have no bodyguard.

RAFIZADEH: I have no bodyguard.

GELLERMAN: Are you not fearful that some...

RAFIZADEH: Sure, I'm fearful. I have a lot of fear. Even when I left this morning, my mother was crying. But I have

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no choice. What can I do? Even if I hired two bodyguards, how I can stop CIA?

GELLERMAN: You're not thinking of me, though.

RAFIZADEH: No, I'm not thinking of you. But I believe all of us, we die once in our life. And it's better to die once rather than a hundred times a day.

GELLERMAN: Meaning?

RAFIZADEH: Meaning I have no fear of death.

GELLERMAN: Have you ever been targeted by the CIA or SAVAK?

RAFIZADEH: Sure.

GELLERMAN: You've been the target of an assassination attempt?

RAFIZADEH: Sure.

GELLERMAN: We'll get into that in a little bit.

Tell me about your experience as a SAVAK agent. You came to the United States as a SAVAK agent?

RAFIZADEH: No, I was a student here in the United States and I was hired here. While I was a student in Iran, I went to jail, I was tortured.

GELLERMAN: By the Shah's people.

RAFIZADEH: By the Shah's people.

GELLERMAN: The people that you later worked for.

RAFIZADEH: The people, I later worked with them. And even some of them, they didn't recognize me. They didn't know I am the same man that I was in jail.

GELLERMAN: So the story actually takes place first in Iran.

RAFIZADEH: First in Iran. Then I came to the United States, then later on I was approached by General Pakruvon (?). He was a beautiful man, wonderful man.

GELLERMAN: He's the head of SAVAK.

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RAFIZADEH: He was the head of SAVAK. And he asked me to help them. I said, "Fine."

GELLERMAN: Okay. I feel we're getting a little ahead of ourselves.

In Iran as a student, then, you were a student, you were protesting the Shah's practice.

RAFIZADEH: Exactly.

GELLERMAN: This was the early '50s.

RAFIZADEH: Early '50s.

GELLERMAN: He was leading a brutal dictatorship.

RAFIZADEH: That's right.

GELLERMAN: And you were active.

RAFIZADEH: I'm active in Iran.

GELLERMAN: You were a student and you were arrested.

RAFIZADEH: I was arrested.

GELLERMAN: And beaten.

RAFIZADEH: Beaten. I was tortured. I was beaten. And several times I was arrested. And then my family, they decided to send me out of Iran. And also I was a member of Toilers Party in Iran, which still I'm a member of Toilers Party.

GELLERMAN: What is that?

RAFIZADEH: Toilers Party.

GELLERMAN: What is that?

RAFIZADEH: Toilers Party is hard-working people in Iran.

GELLERMAN: Oh, okay, Toilers.

RAFIZADEH: Toilers Party. I'm sorry.

GELLERMAN: Uh-huh.

RAFIZADEH: And still I'm a member of the party. And the decision was that if I work with SAVAK, to work from inside, we will too.

GELLERMAN: The person that hired you, the head of SAVAK, did he know about your prior arrests?

RAFIZADEH: Oh, sure, sure. When I was in jail, he was the man, he released me from jail. And the chief of SAVAK at that time didn't hire me. But General Pakruvon pleaded with him and told him that if doesn't change his mind, he's not going to be active anymore. It's in my file in SAVAK right now.

GELLERMAN: Why would he come and speak on your behalf, the head of SAVAK, who -- how did you know him then?

RAFIZADEH: We know him through my friends. And also, he was a democrat. He was a liberal.

GELLERMAN: He was a liberal.

RAFIZADEH: He was against the Shah, himself.

GELLERMAN: And he was the Shah's right-hand man and he was in SAVAK.

RAFIZADEH: He was the Shah's right-hand man.

GELLERMAN: And yet, at that point, there was torture and beating going on in Iran by SAVAK.

RAFIZADEH: By SAVAK. He tried to stop as much he could. While he was in charge, I was in jail, and I was tortured too. That's the system.

GELLERMAN: Okay. Let's see if we can delve through this, because it's so hard for an American to understand this. You have a government within a government, and you have the head of SAVAK saying, you know, "I'm trying to minimize the brutality and suffering," and yet there's suffering and brutality going on within his very ranks.

RAFIZADEH: Yeah, because the Shah is controlling SAVAK. The Shah has his own men in SAVAK. And that's why General Pakruvon lost his job, also.

GELLERMAN: And the General was not one of the Shah's own handpicked men?

RAFIZADEH: No. He was one of them, but he didn't agree a hundred percent with the Shah.

Let me I give you one example. In 1964, General Pakruvon was in charge of SAVAK. Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested at that time. Shah insisted Pakruvon to kill Khomeini. Pakruvon didn't do it.

GELLERMAN: He was supposed to kill Khomeini?

RAFIZADEH: He was to kill -- he was supposed to kill Khomeini.

GELLERMAN: On orders from the Shah.

RAFIZADEH: Orders from the Shah.

GELLERMAN: And he didn't do it.

RAFIZADEH: He didn't do it.

Later on, when Shah left Iran, Khomeini arrested General Pakruvon and he wants to kill him, which he killed him.

GELLERMAN: He did?

RAFIZADEH: He did.

GELLERMAN: Did he not remember how he had saved his life?

RAFIZADEH: It's in my book, also. Pakruvon sent a message to him that "I didn't kill you. And Shah called me foolish. Though are going to -- you are going to kill me."

Khomeini message was, "You were fool. We kill you."

GELLERMAN: What does SAVAK mean? Is there a translation?

RAFIZADEH: SAVAK, it means the organization of gathering information, intelligence for the security of the country.

GELLERMAN: And how pervasive, how widespread is it? How long has it been around?

RAFIZADEH: SAVAK is not any more.

GELLERMAN: It is not.

RAFIZADEH: No. It was dissolved by Khomeini. Before Khomeini, it was dissolved. But at that time, SAVAK was quite big, 8000 people, they were hired by SAVAK. And I would say half of them, they were against Shah. That's why Shah couldn't rule the country anymore.

GELLERMAN: And when you came over to the United States, you came over, ostensibly, as a student.

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RAFIZADEH: As a student.

GELLERMAN: And then only later were you approached by the General to become a member.

RAFIZADEH: By General to become...

GELLERMAN: And the idea was to work from within to destroy.

RAFIZADEH: Not to destroy. The idea of General was not destroy.

GELLERMAN: You were a loyalist to the Shah?

RAFIZADEH: Not to be loyal to the Shah, also, to stop revolution.

GELLERMAN: To stop revolution.

RAFIZADEH: To stop revolution. At that time, we believed revolution is coming.

GELLERMAN: This is in the late '50s?

RAFIZADEH: This is in 1959, 1960. And I remember even at that time there were several article in the newspaper, Manchester Guardian, Le Monde in France, that they predicted revolution is coming to Iran.

So we tried to stop revolution as much we can do. But we failed.

GELLERMAN: Why stop the revolution? If the conditions were so bad to have led you to protest, wind up in jail, get beaten, why prevent revolution?

RAFIZADEH: We believed the revolution would destroy many things and revolution would be blind, and we didn't know who would get to power. Exactly, that's what happened. Because we didn't have any leader at that time.

GELLERMAN: What was your job, then, when you first became a member of SAVAK?

RAFIZADEH: My job was to collect newspaper in the United States, at the beginning.

GELLERMAN: Collect newspapers?

RAFIZADEH: Newspaper, articles about the Shah, against the Shah, for Shah. Send them to Iran, and translate them.

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GELLERMAN: Innocent enough job. Did you have any special training before you came over?

RAFIZADEH: No.

GELLERMAN: No special training.

RAFIZADEH: No special training.

GELLERMAN: You had served -- you hadn't even served in the army.

RAFIZADEH: No, I didn't serve in the army. No. I don't know how to fire. I don't know how to handle a gun.

GELLERMAN: So you -- how long did you clip newspapers? How long did that go on?

RAFIZADEH: For two or three years we did that.

GELLERMAN: Weren't you frustrated? Here you were head of SAVAK in the United States, and clipping newspapers?

RAFIZADEH: No, the office was too small, you know. At that time, the office was too small. We didn't have that much demonstration against the Shah. But later on it got bigger.

GELLERMAN: The Central Intelligence Agency knew you were here?

RAFIZADEH: Oh, yes.

GELLERMAN: They knew you were a member of SAVAK?

RAFIZADEH: Oh, sure.

GELLERMAN: And they knew what SAVAK was, of course.

RAFIZADEH: Sure.

GELLERMAN: Did you have ongoing relationships with them?

RAFIZADEH: Since 1965 we had relationship with them, too. I had relationship with CIA. And FBI was informed, too. Because in Teheran they introduced me to CIA and to FBI as liaison officer.

GELLERMAN: When was this, before you left for the -- after you -- on one of your trips back?

RAFIZADEH: No, no. It was in 1965, around that time.

GELLERMAN: Let me ask you something about the book.

Again, we're talking to Masur Rafizadeh. He's the former chief of SAVAK USA. And the book is "Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal: An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran."

The book. Did you have to clear it through the CIA?

RAFIZADEH: No. CIA was informed about the manuscript. They came to New York City. The CIA officer talked to me three days. The first day, he demanded the manuscript for censorship.

GELLERMAN: The CIA officer came to you. He knew you were writing it.

RAFIZADEH: Yes, he knew.

GELLERMAN: How did he know?

RAFIZADEH: I don't know, to be honest with you, how they found out about it. But he told me, "Just give me the manuscript. I'll go to Washington and we check the book. And if we don't like something, we pick it up. And we will give you a secretary. We will give you some good information, you put in your book."

GELLERMAN: That's very nice of him.

RAFIZADEH: I said, "I'm going to give you carte blanche to write a history."

Then, of course, it was long discussion for three days, you know. Then he attempt to bribe me. He said, "How much you spend for the book? How many years you spent on it? We take care of you."

I said, "No."

GELLERMAN: Had you ever met this agent before?

RAFIZADEH: Oh, yes.

GELLERMAN: You had. You knew...

RAFIZADEH: I knew him. Sure.

GELLERMAN: On a personal basis.

RAFIZADEH: Personal basis.

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And finally he told me William Casey is not going to tolerate my book. And if I don't give the book to them, they are going to kill me.

GELLERMAN: And you responded?

RAFIZADEH: To be honest with you, I cried. I said, "All my life I work for freedom, for liberty, and I help you. I thought you are going to help humanity. Now you are going to kill me."

And he felt I am getting weak and I'm giving up, I'm going to give them the book. Then he said, "Now, look. Think about it." He said, "Just imagine you are making a lecture someplace. One in the crowd, one person can get up, boom. Who did it? Khomeini doesn't like you. Shah's people doesn't like you. We don't like you. Who can find out how they did it?"

And here I told him that I prefer to die once, not hundred times a day.

GELLERMAN: So the CIA has never looked at your book. Everything in there is what you wanted to put in there.

RAFIZADEH: Exactly. I didn't give the book to them. Of course, they brought it to the Justice Department. The Justice Department, several time, they came to New York City, the lawyer of Justice Department, the lawyer of CIA. They came to my attorneys. They asked for the book. I told them, "I'm not going to give the book to you."

The point they had, "You are going to reveal some information, some intelligence that will be against national security of the country."

GELLERMAN: Would you have done it?

RAFIZADEH: No. I'm not destructive. I'm critical.

GELLERMAN: But what they think is national security...

RAFIZADEH: What they think national security, that's another question. But even at that time, I said to lawyer of Justice Department, "I'm not going to do it. And there will be nothing against national security of the country in my book."

GELLERMAN: Are there things that you left out, that you consciously left out because of that reasoning?

RAFIZADEH: Yes.

GELLERMAN: There are.

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RAFIZADEH: There are.

GELLERMAN: And do you have any intention of ever making those known?

RAFIZADEH: No. No. Unless if they are published in future and they are not the whole truth, I will put the whole truth down, but as long as it's not against the national security of the country. Firmly, I believe it.

GELLERMAN: Are you an American citizen at this point?

RAFIZADEH: I be an American citizen in a few months.

GELLERMAN: Oh.

RAFIZADEH: I'm permanent resident.

GELLERMAN: So you've really been here for over 25 years.

RAFIZADEH: Since 1957, I'm here.

GELLERMAN: So, almost that long.

The number is 885-8850....

SAVAK is a hated word.

RAFIZADEH: I know it.

GELLERMAN: Everybody -- there's no one that will -- I mean you mention the word and you get this response. It makes me ill, from what I know of SAVAK. And here you come here, you tell me that there's a good part to SAVAK? It's almost beyond belief.

RAFIZADEH: So it's hard to believe it, but the people that work in SAVAK, I would say about 300, 250 of them, they were sick. They did torture people, they killed people. They did almost everything. Unbelievable what they did. But all of them, they're not like that.

GELLERMAN: You saw your job in the United States, the big picture now, when you were here -- what was it that you were trying to do then? What was it that you were trying to do as the head of SAVAK USA?

RAFIZADEH: To defeat the Shah, to scare him of the United States, and also to support the opposition of the Shah. For instance, Shah came to Howard University, I believe it was, in 1968. And it was a huge demonstration against him.

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GELLERMAN: I remember that.

RAFIZADEH: But I was in touch with the security and I unleashed them.

GELLERMAN: You unleashed...

RAFIZADEH: I unleashed.

GELLERMAN: ...the protesters?

RAFIZADEH: The protesters.

GELLERMAN: It was you.

RAFIZADEH: It was me.

I couldn't see the face of the Shah when he was talking. And the man he killed, they were my friend. I became [unintelligible].

GELLERMAN: When was this? Who was the man that he killed?

RAFIZADEH: Ali Zohari (?) was editor of the chief of our newspaper, and he was a party member. And Shah jailed him and he has heart attack. He died.

And the only thing that bothered me that day, I send a letter to Zohari in Teheran that I talk to some physician in Mass. General Hospital in Boston. And if he can get a passport to come to United States, they will treat him.

So, Shah didn't give him passport to leave the country.

As we were landing at Logan Airport in Boston, the face of Zohari came to me. And when Shah was talking about human rights at Howard University and advising American people what to do, and he was messiah in human rights, I couldn't control myself.

GELLERMAN: Did you want to kill the Shah?

RAFIZADEH: No. I wouldn't do that.

GELLERMAN: Never wanted to kill the Shah?

RAFIZADEH: No, never.

GELLERMAN: Even when you had the opportunity, one-on-one?

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RAFIZADEH: If I had the opportunity to kill the Shah, never would I do it, because I was brought up nonviolence. That was the Toilers Party principle, was obey the law, nonviolence. Because with violence, with bloodshed, we don't get any place. That was the [unintelligible] we believe in it.

GELLERMAN: It's really hard to believe that someone who was head of SAVAK in the United States does not exercise a degree of violence. I mean it's just -- it sounds like a contradiction in terms.

RAFIZADEH: Sure, it looks like that. But even I tell you something else. I know someone in New York City wants to kill the Shah. I stop him also. I report him.

GELLERMAN: We have a goodly amount of time. We're going to start taking calls now. There's plenty of parts of the book that I want to talk about.

Masur Rafizadeh, "Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal: An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran."

...You're on the air.

WOMAN: I have a question for your guest. I understand that he was the target of at least one assassination attempt. Does he know for sure that one of those attempts was made by the CIA? If so, how does he know it? And could he relate the circumstances?

RAFIZADEH: No, that attempt was not by CIA. That attempt was by Ayatollah Khomeini from Teheran. And CIA informed me about that attempt.

GELLERMAN: When was that?

RAFIZADEH: It was 1982. CIA informed me that I'm on the hit list of Khomeini.

WOMAN: Thank you.

GELLERMAN: ...Hello.

WOMAN: ...Well, I have a few points to make. First of all is that this person says that Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini, he actually closes the activities of SAVAK. Please ask him that, what does SAVAMA means right now?

GELLERMAN: Ask him yourself.

WOMAN: Tell me...

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RAFIZADEH: Yes, I...

WOMAN: Would you please let me finish my statement.

Khomeini, after he came to power, he reorganized SAVAK and he called it SAVAMA. And it is much more brutal than SAVAK in the Shah's regime.

Irrespective of that is the point that -- I hope that you bear with me and let me mention my point. My point is that in 1978 Washington Post -- if you want, I will get a Xerox copy of Washington Post...

GELLERMAN: No, that's quite all right. What we'd like you to do is get to the point.

WOMAN: Okay. So in 1978 the Washington Post wrote an article about this guy, and he explained his atrocities. He was, himself, one of the torturers of SAVAK. And he, himself, in response to the article in Washington Post, he wrote that SAVAK has been one of the most effective and humane intelligence services in the world. And right now he's saying that SAVAK was this and this.

Of course, I'm not a person who's pro-Shah. But I'm telling you the facts. Irrespective of all, this person has been actually prosecuted by FBI. He has stolen a million dollars of SAVAK from Shah. Empress Farah, she gave him, I think, two or three million dollars to contribute to Eton College.

GELLERMAN: What's the point?

WOMAN: Pardon me, sir?

GELLERMAN: I'm not following you.

Are you following this, Masur?

RAFIZADEH: I'm following.

GELLERMAN: Please, if you...

RAFIZADEH: Yeah, sure.

Do you want to have the answer, Ma'am?

WOMAN: Well, I didn't finish, if I may.

So, again FBI has blocked his account in the bank. And he's actually a nasty person. And he has in all his life, he has been following blindly the orders of the Shah and SAVAK. And

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right now he has 100 percent, 180 degrees he has changed, and he's now talking against Shah.

And if you have read his book, his book is really a -- he has written the activities of, I don't know, of Shah and how he was reigning. And it's a very obscene thing. I'm really sorry that you have invited this guy to this show tonight.

Well, these were some points that I wanted to make.

GELLERMAN: Thank you for the call. Let's get a response.

RAFIZADEH: First of all, I didn't say SAVAMA is better than SAVAK, or SAVAK was better than SAVAMA.

GELLERMAN: SAVAMA?

RAFIZADEH: SAVAMA is intelligence office of Khomeini, that they call it SAVMA. There is no such thing in Iran as SAVAMA.

GELLERMAN: There is not such a thing?

RAFIZADEH: There is not such thing in Iran as SAVAMA.

And I didn't say, also, that Shah was better than Khomeini, or Khomeini was better than Shah. Khomeini, hundred percent, is worse than Shah. And I wrote it in my book, too.

Now, you said that Washington Post wrote an article about me and I interviewed with them. Never I interview any newspaper any place in the United States until last Friday, which was on Today Show. Never.

Now, accusation about money, three million dollars wife of Shah gave to me, those things? No.

GELLERMAN: You never profited personally from the Shah, his wife?

RAFIZADEH: No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

GELLERMAN: You're on the air.

MAN: I would like to make a comment on Mr. Rafizadeh. He, in his book, he -- a number of comments, shall I say.

To begin with, he talks about the fact that the American military advisers were killed by the Shah, and he talks about atrocities of that time. The military advisers -- and he talks

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about Mansour having been killed by the Shah, and other things like that. I mean it really is totally preposterous to have him say these things, when the Mujaheddin themselves have admitted that they were responsible for the killing of the three American officers. The person who was responsible for the killing of Mansour, it's very clear he's part of the Islamic Fedayana (?) Islam, as it's called. That has altogether been established.

All these items that he mentions are just lies because it is there that it is not true. He talks about being witness of various activities. He goes up to the Waldorf-Astoria, goes upstairs. There the Shah is and someone else is in there, the court minister, and he walks right in. And of course there's no guard at the door. He knocks but there's no guard. Then he walks into the bedroom. And sure enough, there what shouldn't be taking place is taking -- I mean it's so -- in the Waldorf-Astoria, the Shah without a guard at the door. It's so preposterous.

GELLERMAN: Hold on. Just hang on.

MAN: It's really beyond imagination.

GELLERMAN: Hang on for a second, okay?

MAN: Yes, certainly. I'll hold on.

GELLERMAN: Masur?

RAFIZADEH: I stated in the book that the American adviser to Iran, they were killed by Shah. What Shah did with SAVAK, there were some radical, they did like to kill American adviser. Shah penetrated these people and had them ready. Anytime in the United States it was an article against the Shah about human rights...

GELLERMAN: You've got to bring the listeners up to this because we're losing it, I think.

MAN: Yeah, but...

GELLERMAN: Hold on for a second.

Who was assassinated?

RAFIZADEH: Several American adviser, they were assassinated in Iran.

GELLERMAN: In Iran.

RAFIZADEH: In Iran.

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GELLERMAN: At the bequest [sic] of the Shah.

RAFIZADEH: At the request of the Shah.

GELLERMAN: And those assassinations were done by SAVAK agents.

RAFIZADEH: By SAVAK agents.

GELLERMAN: Okay. Then unfold the story.

RAFIZADEH: And anytime we had some news in the United States against the Shah, that there is no freedom in Iran, there's no human rights, Shah would kill some of those people to prove if there is freedom in this country, they will kill American people.

Now, coming to Mansour, or other allegation of killing Razmora (?) and his own brother, in Howard University there is a department of oral history. Howard University is going to publish a book in future, at least 40 people that testify to oral history who killed Mansour, who killed Ali Reza, the brother of the Shah, who killed General Razmora. And all this thing is going to be documented in future.

GELLERMAN: Caller?

MAN: Yes. I'd like to just mention something.

Look, you admit -- of course these things are preposterous, and I know them to be so because I'm in a position to know that they are so. But that's another issue.

GELLERMAN: How are you -- let me ask you before you proceed -- you can't let that go. What are your position are you in that you should know that...

MAN: Well, I'm in a position that I have been close to this business and I know -- I know this gentleman.

GELLERMAN: Do you work for the Central Intelligence Agency?

MAN: I know this gentleman very, very closely, far closer than he imagines.

Anyway, to get back to the issue, if I may continue.

You admit that you were acting as a traitor to Iran and to the Shah while you were receiving his pay. What can one -- how can one believe that right now you are not a paid agent to produce this book to discredit the Shah's son, who...

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GELLERMAN: Good point.

MAN: ...has the possibility -- what makes -- how can one possibly believe that you, who for 20 years acted as a traitor to Iran, are now longer -- suddenly you are no longer a traitor to Iran. How can one believe that you have suddenly changed about-face and you no longer are a [Persian expression]?

GELLERMAN: What was that -- is that...

RAFIZADEH: That's a bad word, bad word.

GELLERMAN: Well, let's get a response. That's a good question, though. And a good question is, how do we know that you're not...

RAFIZADEH: First of all, I was not traitor to Iran or to Iranian people. I was traitor to dictator, to the Shah, that he was killing Iranian people.

GELLERMAN: So you consider yourself a traitor to the Shah of Shahs.

RAFIZADEH: Shah. Exactly. And that was my belief from the beginning. And I'm glad I finish it.

GELLERMAN: Did the CIA know that you were acting as a double agent, or did they think that you were a pure representative of the Shah?

RAFIZADEH: No, they know that I was double agent.

GELLERMAN: They knew you were a double agent.

RAFIZADEH: They know that I was double agent. Surely.

GELLERMAN: ...Hi, you're on the air.

WOMAN: Well, actually, I have a question for Rafizadeh. The first question is, he was one of the torturers in Iran. He destroyed the country. And if I were an American, I would have kicked him out because he destroyed his own country. He's going to destroy your country, too.

In second place, I have other question. How he got ten million property in New Jersey? As far as we know, under Iranian law, he didn't have any rich family. How he got this money?

In third place, he is a thief, he is a idiot, and he destroyed the country. And that was a [unintelligible] lie. And I would like to [unintelligible] he is destroying the country and he's lying, and he's going to destroy your country too.

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That's all I can say. I'm waiting for his answer.

GELLERMAN: Okay. Not one of your fans.

Ten million dollars?

RAFIZADEH: I don't have ten million dollars.

WOMAN: You have ten million dollars. You have a property in New Jersey farm, ten million dollars worth, Mr. Rafizadeh.

I don't know. You are helping Khomeini. You destroyed the country. You are killing almost two million people in Iran. There are two million homeless outside Iran, and you're innocent, you're acting innocent.

RAFIZADEH: No, no. That's not true. Don't get excited.

WOMAN: I am excited because you are lying. You are giving out a bunch of lies to fool American people. You know what dreadful an animal you are?

RAFIZADEH: Thank you.

GELLERMAN: Let me ask you something.

RAFIZADEH: Thank you.

GELLERMAN: Have you ever been involved in killing anyone, directly, indirectly?

RAFIZADEH: No, no.

GELLERMAN: Have you ever ordered the execution of anyone?

RAFIZADEH: No.

GELLERMAN: Have you ever approved the execution of anyone?

RAFIZADEH: No. How I can do that? I always work in United State of America. How you can kill people in United State? How you can...

GELLERMAN: You told me that if the CIA wanted to do it, they could do it with impunity.

RAFIZADEH: No. I didn't do anything. There is FBI

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here. There is police department here. I didn't commit any crime inside of United State of America. No.

GELLERMAN: ...You're on the air.

MAN: ...I will be very, very short. I have listened to all the five people, or four people before me. And I, generally speaking, quite agree with them, totally. I know Rafizadeh very well, since he was a student in New York. And I have known him ever since. And I have known him, what he has done for the country, treacherously. He has been a traitor to the country, now that he has written the book, because now he has opened his hand and he has told us how treacherous he was, because his life, his wealth, everything that he owns belongs to the very regime that now he is blackmailing.

GELLERMAN: He's blackmailing?

MAN: Well, he has said things bad about the Shah, about the regime, about the chief of the SAVAK in Teheran, and other things, which is absolutely a lie. All of it is a lie.

I don't know, he is perhaps trying to build an image for himself with the Mujaheddin or with Khomeini or with the Communists. I have no idea.

GELLERMAN: Could you cite us one example that you can definitively prove that is a lie?

MAN: Yes. Of course. Of course. Because he comes from a very poor family, and now he has an estate in New Jersey with almost 400 milking cows, and perhaps 20,000 acres of land.

GELLERMAN: Is...

MAN: And I don't want any answers. I just want to tell you that what he is, to know him, that he is absolutely a liar. And what he ever tells you or has written in his book is absolute nonsense, absolute nonsense.

RAFIZADEH: Thank you.

GELLERMAN: Thank you for the call.

Twenty -- what was it, 20,000 acres?

RAFIZADEH: Twenty thousand acres, 400 cows.

GELLERMAN: Where are you living?

RAFIZADEH: I live in New Jersey?

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GELLERMAN: Where?

RAFIZADEH: I live in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey.

GELLERMAN: And how big is your house?

RAFIZADEH: The house is a normal house.

GELLERMAN: A normal house.

RAFIZADEH: Normal house.

GELLERMAN: You filled out income tax this year. Can I ask how much you made this year?

RAFIZADEH: I'm in real estate [unintelligible]. I fill out income tax, too.

GELLERMAN: And how much did you make this year?

RAFIZADEH: Not that much. About 35,000.

GELLERMAN: Thirty-five thousand dollars. You're not a millionaire? You don't have secret bank accounts?

RAFIZADEH: No, no. Not secret bank accounts. I'm not millionaire. I live with my brother, with my mother.

GELLERMAN: You're on the air.

MAN: Your guest this evening is, in my opinion, [unintelligible] is a traitor not only to his country, but his people in Iran. He has been -- although now in a few months he's going to be a citizen of this country, but he was a traitor to his former country, Iran, and to his Iran people.

GELLERMAN: Let me just ask you, specifically. We've heard that charge now six times.

MAN: Okay. You want me to go to specifics why?

GELLERMAN: Absolutely.

MAN: He is -- he was a CIA mole in SAVAK. Meaning what? He was recruited -- he joined SAVAK because he hated the Shah and he wanted to work -- in his book, he admits that -- I got a chance to look at it this weekend. He admits that he wanted to work in the United States and in SAVAK against the Shah. Well, he joined the CIA way back in '65, and from there on he worked against the Shah.

One of the reasons that he work against the Shah,

because of -- I don't know his background. He talked about in his books, saying that he used to go to the whorehouses in Iran, and the first thing that he did when coming out was going to New York and work with the whorehouses.

In his book, he revealed about the \$60 million that Shah gave to Nixon for his campaign. If this was true, if this was true, do you think the American media are going to be silent about this?

GELLERMAN: Let's find out.

MAN: And one more question. This shows how CIA work against the Shah for his downfall through people like him. He, in his book, discusses that earlier he was the one who was contacting the New York Times and Newsweek and Time to write articles against the Shah.

GELLERMAN: And that's true, is that not?

MAN: And he used to send the clips to Teheran to tell Teheran he has [unintelligible] on having the information about the anti-Shah articles even before the articles is being published. And he was very proud of it.

GELLERMAN: He is very proud of it. If you see him in the studio now, he's agreeing. And it's certainly in his book. I read it. In fact, he was doing exactly what you're saying. He was planting the articles, reporting it to Iran, saying that, "Yes. See how good I am?" And then it was all acting. But he agrees with you.

MAN: Exactly. Look at early in your talk show he discusses that he had been protecting all the secrets about the CIA. That's right. He hasn't discussed anything about the CIA. In his book, he doesn't talk about what Khomeini's people are doing. For example, he was in touch with the people like Yazi Ghotbzadeh (?), Ali Aga, those guys who are in power right now. I mean -- Ghotbzadeh is dead right now, fortunately.

But he was the man who was using the payroll of the CIA to also organize anti-Shah demonstrations in this country. And after the revolution, he was the man in charge in CIA to keep contact with his buddies in Iran -- for example, people like Deputy Foreign Minister Lavisan (?), who works for CIA. There are also other guys in Iranian government right now who work for CIA. And it's a big scandal.

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response. Hold on.

RAFIZADEH: Look, I didn't do anything wrong to Iranian

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or to Iran. Only I was against the Shah. Whatever intelligence I had about Iran, about the Shah, I relayed it to CIA. Hopefully, they will take advice. The country wouldn't fall in the hand of Khomeini.

And you said in my book I didn't say anything about Khomeini. I don't believe you read the last part of the book.

MAN: Well, I did. I did most of the part I read. You didn't discuss any CIA agent. How come you discussed about all the SAVAK agents and discuss about what you used to do, how you used to win the heart of Nassiri or Pakruvon about your job in United States,...

RAFIZADEH: Yes.

MAN: ...but you never even mentioned anything about the CIA activities in Iran? That's why the CIA contacted you...

RAFIZADEH: If the CIA...

MAN: I said you are still working with the CIA as...

RAFIZADEH: Please, sir. You can't tell me still I'm working for CIA.

MAN: ...article in Times magazine saying you're still working as a consultant to the CIA, under their payroll. And I bet your book is a part of the misinformation that you're putting out at this time, paid by either CIA or Khomeini.

GELLERMAN: Let's ask. Let's ask. I'm not sure. I'm willing to accept an answer. I'm not sure if I'll believe it.

Are you on the payroll of the CIA right now?

RAFIZADEH: No. I'm not on the payroll of the CIA. I'm not on the payroll of Khomeini. CIA is against my book.

MAN: Oh, that's just absolutely not true.

RAFIZADEH: Okay. If you say it's not true, I cannot prove anything to you.

MAN: How come in your book it didn't discuss any about the names of these guys, the professor who introduced you to John F. Kennedy, the New York Times people? You said you were introduced to the State Department guy who used to be a...

[Confusion of voices]

MAN: How come you never mentioned any of...

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RAFIZADEH: You want I release the name of the CIA agents in the United States?

MAN: Just earlier in the book you mentioned that when you met Kennedy in Boston. And a few days later you were introduced to the New York Times and the Times magazine guy, which you keep your relationships [unintelligible]. And you say you met a guy who said that he's a member of the State Department, but actually you later found out he was a CIA guy. How come you never -- you protect these guys, and you didn't protect your...

RAFIZADEH: The whole point is I'm protecting CIA again and CIA paid me to write this book to discredit the Shah. That's what you're trying to say.

MAN: You better believe it. And you are...

RAFIZADEH: So that's your opinion, and I respect it. Thank you very much.

MAN: You're a traitor. Okay?

RAFIZADEH: I'm not a traitor. I was a trai...

MAN: And in the end of the book you try to discredit President Reagan.

GELLERMAN: We're going to get into that. Thank you for your call.

Thank you for your call.

MAN: ...I have no personal knowledge of Mr. Rafizadeh, and I don't know him at all. So therefore I'm not biased, one way or another. I have one comment and two questions.

My comment is, with his present-day state of knowledge of the English language, I wonder how they relied on his translations 25-30 years ago. That's my comment.

GELLERMAN: How they what? I sorry.

MAN: How they relied on his translations 25-30 years ago.

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response as you go along.

MAN: No, this is not the response. This is just a comment. Now I have two questions.

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My first question is, how come he wasn't found out by the SAVAK that he was working against them?

My second question is, if he wasn't working for SAVAK, who was sending all these reports about anti-Shah students and activities and about the people who were anti-Shah here and were tortured, supposedly, when they got back?

GELLERMAN: Let's take the first one. I'm not sure I understood the question. Rephrase it, please?

MAN: ...How come he wasn't found out by SAVAK?

GELLERMAN: How come you weren't found out by those people, SAVAK, that you...

[Confusion of voices]

RAFIZADEH: They couldn't find out. But some of the people in SAVAK, even they did know I'm working for CIA, and we worked together. I'm not going to reveal the name of those people, also.

MAN: You mean in all this structure of SAVAK, nobody know that you were working against them?

GELLERMAN: Did anyone know that you were subverting the Shah, as a SAVAK agent?

RAFIZADEH: In SAVAK?

GELLERMAN: Yes.

RAFIZADEH: Some of them, they were aware of it.

GELLERMAN: They were aware of it.

RAFIZADEH: They were aware of it.

GELLERMAN: And did they try to take action against you?

RAFIZADEH: No. They believed, they believed the same philosophy that I have.

MAN: I don't believe that, but...

RAFIZADEH: Okay. You don't have to believe. You don't have to believe it.

GELLERMAN: How powerful a man were you in SAVAK?

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RAFIZADEH: I was the chief of SAVAK in the United States.

GELLERMAN: The chief of SAVAK in the United States.

RAFIZADEH: That's right.

GELLERMAN: That's pretty heavy duty.

RAFIZADEH: That's heavy, but not that heavy. Depends on what kind of relationship you have with the officer in Teheran and who is the boss, who runs the office. All this depends.

MAN: Let me inject there. This makes me believe that the whole SAVAK, or the whole power structure of SAVAK was against the Shah, and also CIA knew about it. Therefore there's not much to say about CIA's activities.

RAFIZADEH: No, I don't say the whole SAVAK was against the Shah, but let me I tell you something...

GELLERMAN: Hold on. If you ask a question, you should get an answer. Hold on.

RAFIZADEH: I tell you something. I don't say the whole SAVAK was against the Shah, but...

MAN: But the power structure, at least...

RAFIZADEH: No. Please. But in SAVAK, in the restroom of SAVAK, there was a problem. Always they would write down "Down with the Shah."

GELLERMAN: In the restroom?

RAFIZADEH: In the restroom of the headquarter of SAVAK.

GELLERMAN: In the United States or in...

RAFIZADEH: In Teheran. In Teheran. And you know no one could get to the building of SAVAK except the employee of the SAVAK. And always it was written "Down with the Shah."

Now you are coming to tell me that all the people that work with SAVAK, they were for Shah? No. That was not true.

MAN: Now, if for 20 years people were writing things against the Shah in the SAVAK, then you can't say really SAVAK was as...

RAFIZADEH: Okay. What was the second question? I forgot. I forgot the second question.

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GELLERMAN: What was your second question, please?

MAN: Well, my second question was that if he wasn't working for SAVAK, who was sending all the information about the anti-Shah students?

RAFIZADEH: Okay. We send some information...

MAN: And if this information was not going from him, then how come they were not suspect that he was not doing anything for them?

RAFIZADEH: I did send information to SAVAK about those people, that they were against the Shah. I supported those people, also. And no one can prove to me today that one single Iranian in the United States, he went back to Iran, he was killed or he was tortured.

GELLERMAN: No one that you sent reports on?

RAFIZADEH: No.

GELLERMAN: Did you ever save anyone?

RAFIZADEH: I save a lot of people. I had man, he came to the consulate, he was screaming he must have his passport to go to Teheran because his father was sick, in New York City. The consulate wouldn't give him the passport because SAVAK said, "Don't give him the passport."

GELLERMAN: But you were SAVAK.

RAFIZADEH: SAVAK headquarter would write to State Department of Iran, will inform the consul general in New York City, "Don't give passport to him." And the man was not only resident of the United State, he was acting in Germany, he was acting in France, he was acting in London, and he was acting in Berkeley, California.

So I went to the office and I asked him, "What you need?"

He said, "I want my passport."

I asked the consul general to issue the passport to him. They issued a passport. Then I walked down with him in the street. I said, "Where you are going?"

He said, "I'm going to Kennedy Airport tonight."

I said, "If you go to Kennedy Airport tonight, the time

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you land in Teheran, they take you to jail, they torture you. Now you want to go?"

He look at me. He said, "No. I'm not leaving."

I saved many people that way.

GELLERMAN: Masur Rafizadeh, former chief of SAVAK....

You're on the air.

MAN: ...I just have a quick question. Fortunately, or unfortunately, I don't know Mr. Rafizadeh. I'm an Iranian living in United States.

My question to you, Mr. Rafizadeh, is, let's say if an American CIA agent be transferred to a country, say Germany or England or any -- or even an Eastern Bloc country. He starts being a double agent for that country. Is he the right person, or is he a trustworthy person, or not? That's all I have. That's my question.

When a person is a double agent, I have a hard time to trusting whatever he says.

GELLERMAN: Good point.

RAFIZADEH: Good point.

MAN: ...any comment from you?

RAFIZADEH: Yes. I'm going to give you the comment. A double agent -- I believe, at that time, that if CIA has all the intelligence about Iran and they will supply those intelligence to State Department, to the President of the United State, they will start helping the Shah, and therefore they will help Iranian government, Iranian people.

MAN: Your first...

RAFIZADEH: Wait, wait. Please. I'm sorry.

If it would happen, we wouldn't have Khomeini at power at this time. Shah will be in his own palace. It didn't happen like that.

I don't call myself a traitor.

MAN: I didn't call you a traitor. But what I'm saying is, I'm saying your first, primary mission as an Iranian government employee was to protect Iranian government and people's property, information, whatever they had. You shared that with a

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foreign country, the United States.

RAFIZADEH: No, I don't believe I shared it with foreign country, because I believe in humanity.

MAN: Now wait a minute.

RAFIZADEH: No, no. I don't believe I share it with the United State. No. I believe in humanity, and I helped United State, who helped Iran.

MAN: Can I give the information that I have to, say, Soviet Union and say, "I believe in humanity?"

RAFIZADEH: What kind of information, sir, I gave to CIA? I didn't give top secret information to CIA. I informed CIA what is going on inside of Iran.

GELLERMAN: And what did they do with that information? They basically rejected it.

RAFIZADEH: They rejected it. They rejected it. They supported the Shah to the last minute.

MAN: Thank you very much. I don't have any more comment because I don't know Mr. Rafizadeh. I just read part of his book and I thought it sounds ridiculous. A person suddenly becomes a born-again person which says the truth. I have a hard time believing somebody for, say, whatever -- how old he is, he would suddenly come out to say the truth. I don't know.

So, I wish him good luck.

GELLERMAN: I must say, before we take this call, it is a little hard to believe a double agent, to begin with, especially someone who was working for SAVAK and had dealings with the CIA. You must understand people's skepticism.

RAFIZADEH: I know. I agree with you. But all these people that are calling, they are the follower of the Shah. I recognize some of the voices.

GELLERMAN: Is that right?

RAFIZADEH: Sure. I know them. And they're calling one after the other because they are shocked [by] what I wrote about the Shah. But my duty, my social obligation was to put down whatever I experienced in my life. This is the whole thing. They don't understand that.

GELLERMAN: You're on the air.

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MAN: ...Thank you very much for this fascinating show. It's amazing. I think that Walt Disney would not be able to produce such a great fiction as this right now I heard over the waves. [Laughter]

GELLERMAN: I've never been accused of being Walt Disney.

MAN: Well, why not?

GELLERMAN: Question?

MAN: Yes. Well, I have one statement, very short, and two questions. And I would leave your guest to answer.

First of all, my statement. I fully concur and agree with whatever your listeners have said till now, as far as Mr. Rafizadeh is concerned. Fully concur. That's my statement.

GELLERMAN: Have you read the book?

MAN: I certainly did. I read it in depth.

GELLERMAN: Do you have any firsthand familiarity or other information that you can substantiate what you're saying?

MAN: I'll be very much happy to do so if Mr. Rafizadeh will answer my two questions that I will pose to you right now.

GELLERMAN: One at a time.

MAN: The first question is, Mr. Rafizadeh at the beginning of your program mentions the name of General Pakruvon, the former head of SAVAK. And he states and indicates that General Pakruvon was against the Shah, and he asked Mr. Rafizadeh to join SAVAK in the United States in order to -- both in the book and in the statement as Mr. Rafizadeh said -- that to inform the Americans here in the United States about the atrocities being committed by the Shah's regime and SAVAK. In that case, if General Pakruvon was such an enemy of the late Shah, how come he was executed by Khomeini within the first month?

RAFIZADEH: Can I answer that, please?

MAN: Pardon me?

RAFIZADEH: Can I answer that question first?

MAN: No. Let me finish the rest. One more question left, and then you can answer both in full, and I'll hang up, because I don't want to argue with you.

And the last question is, would you be willing to come to courts in the United States, in the court of justice in the United States, if we sue you and bring you in to provide us with anything, any proof, any sheet of proof that you have in what you have said in your book? Everything is hearsay, as far as I know. But if you have any evidence, would you be willing to come to a court of law and stand in front of a judge and jury and provide us with evidence that you have?

GELLERMAN: Okay. Let's get a response.

First question?

RAFIZADEH: First question. General Pakruvon, I didn't say he was enemy of the Shah. He didn't agree with the Shah. He didn't agree with the brutality of the Shah.

And also, he told me, "As much you can, inform American Government what was going on inside of Iran." It was the time of General Bakhtiar, that he was in -- he wants to get back to Iran.

Now, the second question. I have all the documents...

MAN: No, no. You didn't finish. I said why was, then, General Pakruvon...

RAFIZADEH: Killed by Khomeini. Khomeini killed him. You should ask Khomeini why Khomeini killed General Pakruvon.

GELLERMAN: Okay. Second question is, would you be willing to...

MAN: And then you escaped very nicely. You became a member of SAVAK, and nobody bothered you till right now. But General Pakruvon was executed by Khomeini. And you're not being executed or persecuted by Khomeini or anybody else. No?

RAFIZADEH: No.

MAN: No. Of course not.

Okay, second question. Go ahead.

GELLERMAN: Would you be in a court? Would you testify in...

RAFIZADEH: If anyone is against me, they can go to court. I will go to court. Of course.

MAN: You have all the evidence, everything you said in your book.

GELLERMAN: Can you back up everything you say?

RAFIZADEH: Sure, sure. Of course I can back up all my evidence.

MAN: Okay, fine. Thank you.

GELLERMAN: ...Hi. You're on the air.

MAN: ...I have no question for the so-called author. I don't want to dignify the man.

Whatever you have mentioned, there are so many holes in whatever he has said. His lies start from the cover, when he calls himself the chief of SAVAK. And now, in the radio station, he has modified to the chief of SAVAK in New York.

GELLERMAN: Good point. I had the same question.

MAN: And the lies go on and on and on. The only man alive he quotes is an 80-year-old sick man who cannot dispute whatever he says. The rest of them are all dead. And he does not give us a shred of truth.

For a dreaded SAVAK organization to send a man for paper clippings and for CIA to benefit from his intelligence and information, while Richard Helms is sitting in Teheran as the Ambassador, the man is either, with all due respect, naive or very stupid, or he thinks the American people are stupid.

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response. We're going to break for news in a little bit.

RAFIZADEH: I didn't say American people, they are stupid, or Richard Helms is stupid. I didn't understand the question.

GELLERMAN: Well, he does make one good question. That is, at the bottom of your book it says, "Former chief of SAVAK."

RAFIZADEH: "Former chief of SAVAK." There is not enough room on the jacket to put "Former chief of SAVAK in the United States." It's inside the book. It's in the jacket.

GELLERMAN: Yes. It becomes quite obvious right in here.

RAFIZADEH: Right in the book.

GELLERMAN: We're going to be speaking with Masur Rafizadeh, former chief of SAVAK, the United States branch, into

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the second hour of the Fred Fiske. The book is "Witness: From the Shaw to the Secret Arms Deal: An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran."

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GELLERMAN: ...You're on the air.

WOMAN: I'm 17 years old and I'm Iranian. And first of all, I'd just like to make a point. Your speaker is saying that a lot of the people who've been calling in are pro-Shah. And I'd just like to make the point that some of them are not. In fact, one lady said that she wasn't for the Shah.

But anyway, I'll say up front that I am very much for the Shah. I always will be. I think that the Shah of Iran, the young Shah, is the only sane solution to the chaos that is going on right now. And I don't see -- I mean it's just beyond me why you're spending all this time and effort trying to slander him. You know, I know -- I haven't read your book. I haven't had the pleasure of reading it. But I have, you know, read excerpts. And this guy, the Shah of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi, is trying to save his country. Okay?

I mean I'm not going to go back to Iran unless there's a constitutional democracy or some sort of respectable government back in there. And I don't understand why you're wasting so much time trying to slander him and say he did this and that while he was still a teen-ager, and had this connection with the CIA and that connection with the CIA.

And, you know, I hope you don't consider yourself a patriot. I mean I consider myself a patriot even though, you know, I speak with an American accent and I've got American friends. I go out in the streets and I march at pro-Shah demonstrations and anti-Khomeini demonstrations. I believe in peace and justice, you know, and I want the Shah back. And I don't think I'm crazy.

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response.

Relative to the Ayatollah Khomeini, would you support the Shah, the new Shah?

RAFIZADEH: No.

GELLERMAN: You would not.

RAFIZADEH: No, I would not.

GELLERMAN: Why not?

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RAFIZADEH: Because I don't believe in monarchy. People, they should elect their own leader.

GELLERMAN: So what should be in Iran? Do you support -- you don't support the Ayatollah.

RAFIZADEH: I don't support the Ayatollah. I'm not going to support the son of the Shah, either.

GELLERMAN: How do you respond to this young woman?

RAFIZADEH: She has the right to be in favor of the Shah of Iran, to support him. I don't.

WOMAN: I'd like to know who exactly you do support. Do you support Khomeini?

RAFIZADEH: I support the vote of the people, anyone the people, they like to elect.

WOMAN: As, you know, a coup. Are you satisfied with this government? Are you satisfied with the killing that's going on?

RAFIZADEH: Look, I don't know who is going to come in power in future.

WOMAN: You're talking so much of what the SAVAK did and what the -- you know, SAVAK is doing.

If I may say, Mr. -- I'm sorry. What's your name, the person who...

GELLERMAN: Bruce Gellerman.

WOMAN: A lot of Americans, like yourself, have no idea, even, that there is another SAVAK, you know, operating right now in Iran that is even more notorious and is even worse, and no one's paying attention. And everything is like, "Okay. We'll just leave Khomeini in, leave Khomeini in."

GELLERMAN: Who runs that SAVAK?

WOMAN: Who do you think? Khomeini.

GELLERMAN: We had asked that question before.

Is there another SAVAK existing?

RAFIZADEH: No, there is not another SAVAK in Iran. There are offices that they run inside of Iran, they are worse than SAVAK.

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GELLERMAN: But they're not loyal to the Shah.

RAFIZADEH: No, they're not loyal to the Shah.

WOMAN: I never said they were.

RAFIZADEH: No. I didn't say Khomeini is better than Shah. Khomeini is worse. Khomeini is the crown prince of the Shah.

WOMAN: But, see, what I don't understand is you're willing to sit and let this man who has been engaging our country -- by the way, it is our country -- in a long and futile war, killing hundreds and thousands of young Iranians whose lives could be put to much better use in the future, believe me. And I can't go back there without a chador and something ridiculous because I have no right, as a woman. And if the Shah went back, I would have rights, as a woman. My people would have rights. I want to know what's wrong with people having rights.

GELLERMAN: Were your parents here before the Ayatollah? Were you here before?

WOMAN: I beg your pardon?

GELLERMAN: Were you here before the latest revolution?

WOMAN: Yes. I was sort of back and forth.

GELLERMAN: So you were back. But you had lived in Iran.

WOMAN: Yes, for a short period of time.

GELLERMAN: And your parents are native Iranians?

WOMAN: Well, I'd rather not answer that question.

GELLERMAN: So you have lived at one time under the Shah's rule.

WOMAN: Yes.

GELLERMAN: And you found that it was acceptable to you.

WOMAN: Well, you have to understand, at that time I was, you know, a young girl. I didn't see brutal kidnappings and killings in the street.

GELLERMAN: But we now know that those were going on, don't we?

WOMAN: Well, yes, that's possible. But, you see, that's not my point. My point is what's happening right now. Your speaker is sitting in that studio with you and talking about this and criticizing that and slandering the young Shah. And what he should be doing is trying to make an effort to put some sanity back in Iran. I mean listen to your callers, for example. Your callers have all been -- they've been very educated people, you know, just listening to their voices, and they've been calling him, basically, a liar. And even me, without reading the book, I'm starting to believe it.

And I don't understand why you don't concentrate your efforts on trying to put some sort of sane solution, a respectable government back into Iran, except for Khomeini.

People make fun of Iran now. You know, Iran is on the same plateau as, say, Libya, for example. When, before, Iran as a basically respected nation. I'm not saying that the Shah was without fault.

GELLERMAN: There were tens of thousands of people that were murdered and brutalized.

WOMAN: There are even more murdered now.

GELLERMAN: So you're willing to accept the lesser of two evils?

WOMAN: No. I'm willing to accept something different, constitutional democracy.

GELLERMAN: And the young Shah promises such a government?

WOMAN: The young Shah, you cannot hold him responsible for anything his father did.

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response.

WOMAN: And let me, please, say very quickly that the Shah, the one who passed away, I mean you people are acting as if, you know, he went around and slaughtered people in the streets with his own hands. He did a lot of things to push Iran forward. Perhaps he did it too quickly and that helped bring his downfall. But he built hospitals, he built schools, he sent Iranian kids, like our speaker, abroad and paid for their education overseas, in hopes they'd come back and work for the Iranian people.

I mean it's the SAVAK did the killing. And this man was supposedly the head of SAVAK in the U.S. Where is the blood on his hands? He's supposedly denying it, isn't he?

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response. Thanks for calling.

RAFIZADEH: I'm not going to say that I'm going to favor the son of the Shah or I'm in a position to send the son of the Shah back to Iran. All I'm saying, what happened in the past. I'm trying to put the history straight.

Now, for the son Shah, if people of Iran, they like him, beautiful, fine. He can go back. He can establish any kind of democracy he wants to. Then I will benefit, too.

GELLERMAN: Would you go back to Iran? Could you go back to Iran?

RAFIZADEH: Right now? No.

GELLERMAN: No, not now.

RAFIZADEH: No.

In future, if my life is not in danger, possibly I will go to Iran.

GELLERMAN: But here we had a young woman, she spoke very passionately and very sincerely, and she had lived in Iran. Do you understand her sentiments?

RAFIZADEH: Sure, I do understand that. Because the problem, Bruce, is here. Most of these Iranian people, they left Iran after Shah left or before Shah left. They have a sort of imagination about Iran, what the country was. But today everything is changed. Revolution came, upside-down. SAVAK is gone, gendarmarie is gone, police is gone, army is -- everything is gone.

These Iranian people, I'm for sure, the way they think, if the son of the Shah goes back, the country is the same. No. The whole structure is changing.

GELLERMAN: ...You're on the air.

MAN: ...I have three very short comments. Firstly, I've read much of the book. And at best, it is a figment of somebody's dirty imagination. I mean even Sidney Sheldon would be embarrassed to have written that. And you may know he's someone who usually does not write -- he usually writes very strange fiction.

Now, he talks about social obligations. This fellow had no social obligation because he's a totally insignificant man who is trying to leave a sickeningly dirty little mark in history

before he passes away. In fact, his ancestors would probably be turning around in shame in their grave if they knew what was going on here.

And as for he talks about the son of the Shah, no one cares whether he favors the son of the Shah or not, because it's not important in any way whatsoever. No one cares about his opinion. And already your radio station has given him far too much credit by wasting the host's time and skill in spending it with this person. In fact, I would say you no longer deserve this contribution which you are asking for because you have really disgraced this radio station with wasting your time with this one fellow.

GELLERMAN: Hold on.

RAFIZADEH: Gentleman, that's one of the reason we are not going to have democracy in Iran, and always we have to be under dictatorship. We have to have Shah, we have to have Khomeini. If Khomeini leaves, another dictator will come to power.

MAN: Yes, but I have one question for the speaker.

RAFIZADEH: That's how we behave.

MAN: Now, who are you to comment on this? And why do you think anyone cares...

RAFIZADEH: Look, Gentleman, I wrote a book. You can write a book, too. Other people, they can do it. We have a lot of Iranian technocrats in the United States. We have a lot of Iranian people. They worked for the government. They can write a book, too. I didn't stop them.

MAN: As I said -- and I think I will end this in the right note. I really do pity you for one thing. Your ancestors, believe me, are turning in shame in their grave for having a relation such as you.

And I wish you a good night.

GELLERMAN: Iranians are very warm-blooded people.

RAFIZADEH: Warm-blooded.

GELLERMAN: Very hot-blooded. It's an amazing -- I understand that the history has been very turbulent, that there's a lot of violence. I understand that people have been torn from their families. But as a culture, it's a very -- what's the word I'm looking for -- excitable?

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RAFIZADEH: Excited. You see, most of them, they don't want to hear the opposition. Most of them, they cannot bear in their mind that the other party has a right to say this thing. That's why always it's going to be a dictatorship, until the mind of the people is changed. That's the tragedy in Iran.

GELLERMAN: But you would think that with all these people that came to the United States -- the Shah did send many students to the United States. He spied on most of them -- that they would have brought back some of those -- that cultural tradition of democracy, of give-and-take.

RAFIZADEH: No. Most of them, they didn't. Those that didn't return, they stay in the United State. Some they returned, they came back to United State. Even at the time of the Shah, we had brain drain. We have lot of Iranian physician in United State that were working here, but we have to hire physician from India, from Pakistan at that time, the time of the Shah.

GELLERMAN: ...You're on the air.

MAN: I just wanted to make a few quick passing observations here.

First of all, who published this book?

GELLERMAN: The publisher is Morrow.

MAN: Morrow?

GELLERMAN: Yeah. I think it's James Morrow. Let me just look.

RAFIZADEH: William Morrow.

GELLERMAN: William Morrow.

MAN: Okay. I was curious. Because it seems ironic to me that there's not enough room to put extra words on the cover. I mean typesetting is such that you can do just about anything on a cover. I can understand how a publisher might go about that just to try to make the sales a little bit better. That's a possibility.

But still in all, I guess we can go back to '53, back to the days of the CIA activity that put the Shah on top of the Mossadegh government. I kind of wish things would have stayed the way it was with Mossadegh, and we wouldn't probably have the problems that we have today in Iran. But it was CIA activity that changed things at that point.

And the callers today, all of them so far, as far as I've been able to tell, have had -- were Iranian, originally. The thing that most strikes me, though, is that, just like several people I know from Nicaragua, the Philippines, and so forth and so on, there tends to be a tendency for people who have fled the country during a change of regime to another, they almost unanimously will have a much higher opinion of the regime that was in power when they were doing well. And having fled the country because of that change, I think it will put a slant -- you know what I'm saying? -- on the mentality of the recent immigrants here. Most of them fled because they were doing quite well in the days of the Shah and had reason to fear that they would lose some of that status with the Khomeini regime.

Now, I'm not giving credit to Khomeini, I'm not giving credit to the Shah. I think both had considerable problems. And I think people do pick the lesser of two evils.

The problem that comes to my mind, though, is that so many people are calling in and attacking your guest for having property, considerably property, apparently, in New Jersey. I would be curious if any callers could call in the future and tell what the reference of source for that information is. We may have a common source here, in which we may have a local media who's trying to push another agenda that may be pro-Pahlavi, the son of the Shah. And I wonder if there's not a media in this area that is pushing this in this direction and seems to be appealing to the people who fled that they -- that this change took place to the Khomeini government.

Well, I hope that's clear.

GELLERMAN: Well, it's a little bit convoluted, to be sure.

MAN: A little bit?

GELLERMAN: You know, I mean it's a simple question. Does the man have ten million dollars, or not? Does he have a 20,000 acre farm, or not? I asked him plainly. We got a response. There's no way I can turn it upside-down except ask.

MAN: What I'd be interested to know, Bruce, is that if any callers in the future that do call in, if they could specify what that source is.

GELLERMAN: I agree.

MAN: They all seem to say that there is abundant amount of money. It might be a common source, and it might be a common local source of information that could be wrong, it could be

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right. But I'm just curious if this is just a well-established fact, or if we don't have a local media element that's pushing another direction right now. That's really what I'm getting at.

GELLERMAN: Thanks for your call.

...You're on the air.

MAN: ...You have got a fantastic show. I have a suggestion. Next time you're inviting a joker like him, give us advanced notice. You will have about a half a million listeners responding to your show, and your show is going to be one of the best in the world.

Now my question to Mansour.

If you remember, before 1979 revolution there were about 30,000 U.S. citizens working in Iran in government of Shah. Half of those 30,000 could be CIA employees. Why in the world CIA needed a joker like Mansour in United States to provide what kind of information?

Over 20 years, this guy has been sitting in New York providing information for CIA. Do you believe it? With United States, about 30,000 people living in Iran could not provide, that this guy could provide?

Now my question.

GELLERMAN: Well, that sounds like a damn good question.

MAN: Well, that was my comment. Now about my question.

Ask this gentleman, what did he do with that \$14 million that was sent to him from SAVAK in Iran during 1977? What did he do with that \$14 million that was sent to him?

GELLERMAN: Which \$14 million are you referring to?

MAN: Fourteen million dollars sent from SAVAK to him, through Bank of Bahamas, for providing support when the Shah of Iran come to the United States. What did he do with that money? And why doesn't he talk about it in his book?

GELLERMAN: How do you know that that money existed?

MAN: Well, he knows. And the rest of the Iranians who were working in SAVAK, they know about it.

GELLERMAN: How do you know?

MAN: Well, I was part of SAVAK.

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GELLERMAN: You were part of SAVAK?

MAN: I was.

GELLERMAN: Did you get part of this \$14 million?

MAN: Well, I wish I was in here. I was not in here. I was back in Iran.

Second, what did he do with the money which was sent by late General Nassiri for his wife and children to United States? What did he do with that money?

GELLERMAN: How much was that?

MAN: Millions.

What did he do with amount of money which late General Mogadam (?), the last head of SAVAK, sent for his wife and children to United States? What did he do with that money? Why doesn't he say about this?

If you want to know about Mansour Rafizadeh, why don't you ask the last Ambassador to United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, what kind of an idiot, what kind of a dirty character this gentleman is?

Oh, this is a discredit to your show, to Iranian, and to American. I hope this man never be a citizen of the United States. This is a discredit to this country.

GELLERMAN: Hold on for a second, okay?

Well, he didn't want to hold on.

I want to ask his questions, though. Why did they need you for when they had -- I'm not sure they had 30,000 or 15,000 CIA agents. But really, what did they need you for to clip newspapers? It sounds a little strange.

RAFIZADEH: What do you meant it sounds strange? In the United States?

GELLERMAN: Yeah.

RAFIZADEH: In the United State, they have to have a chief of SAVAK here. They have to have an employee of SAVAK in the United States. They don't need it in Iran. I didn't understand his question. What he was trying to say, that the United State has 30,000 American people in Iran, and most part of those people, they were CIA men. So they could report to CIA; they didn't need me.

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GELLERMAN: Right. And?

RAFIZADEH: So I have nothing to tell him. What can I tell him about those people, what they were doing in Iran?

GELLERMAN: He seemed to have very detailed information about \$14 billion, the Bank of Bahamas.

RAFIZADEH: Bank of Bahama? No. That's allegation.

GELLERMAN: It's an allegation.

RAFIZADEH: Sure. I mean 14 million -- let me...

GELLERMAN: General Nassiri...

RAFIZADEH: All allegation. Fourteen million dollars will come to United States and FBI wouldn't find out about it? No one will report that?

GELLERMAN: You never declared income tax for \$14 million?

RAFIZADEH: No. I mean how I should declare income tax of 14 million if I didn't have the money? That's allegation.

You see, I feel sorry for these people. Instead of correcting the history in future, understanding what happened, why he's out of Iran living in the United State because of the Shah. If Shah would obey the law, if he will be a monarch according to constitution, he was in his palace today, and all these Iranian people, they will be back in Iran. They don't understand that what happened. No, they are furious, they are angry, they are mad because they left their country and the country is in the hands of Khomeini.

GELLERMAN: You're on the air.

MAN: ...I am putting my point of view under the following discussion. Number one, if a citizen knowingly, voluntarily accept to be in service of a foreign intelligence service, in any court of law and conscience, he is a traitor, no matter what is the cause. And then, Mr. Rafizadeh has established himself, by this definition, as a traitor.

Number two, he admits that his motive was to report American authority of what is going on in Iran. There were 80,000 Americans working in Iran, including CIA stations, representative of CIA in SAVAK, in intelligence and counter-intelligence in the army, in police, and even in civilian departments. And every day, they were walking down the streets,

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have meetings, and being witness. I wonder what kind of information Mr. Rafizadeh would provide CIA from inside Iran sitting in New York here.

You had a general, two-star general, as the head of advisory, military advisory, sitting next to the chief of commander staff. You had the advisory of CIA to SAVAK. You had the representative of CIA in the army.

So, unless he was doing something else for CIA, which naturally could be a type of subversive activity in Iran.

Number three, if he admits that he was against the Shah and General Pakruvon, head of SAVAK, as well; now, who has been doing all of this brutality which was ordered by Shah? If all of SAVAK, including him, including chief of SAVAK, was against this brutality, so what is the accusation against SAVAK and the Shah?

And the other one, he says that he used to get the passport of students that headquarters of SAVAK instruction not to be given to them. I don't know a chief of SAVAK in New York had such authority that to go to the embassy or consulate, against the order of headquarter of SAVAK. And even if he would go, naturally they would report to SAVAK that he did so. And I don't think they would let him sit in New York for so many years.

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response.

MAN: I have two other questions.

GELLERMAN: Well, hold on. I'm losing track of them. Okay?

The first is traitor/patriot. That was the first question.

RAFIZADEH: The first question -- I don't call myself traitor because I didn't act against Iranian people. I tried to save the country. I was against revolution, but we failed. It came.

Now, you said that there were 30,000, 40,000, 20,000 American in Iran, all they were working for CIA, four-general-star, three-general-star. I agree with you. The same CIA reported to President that the Shah of Iran will stay in power another 15 years. Now, the CIA, the State Department, the White House, all they said, they were shocked, they were surprised of the downfall of the Shah.

So, would you answer me those 30,000 CIA people, how they were working inside of Iran, what kind of intelligence they used to send to CIA?

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MAN: Number one, I don't...

[Confusion of voices]

RAFIZADEH: Then what happened to His Majesty, the Shah of Iran if all those CIA agents that were reporting to Washington? Then why CIA predicted Shah will stay in power another 15-20 years? Then why State Department, the White House, the CIA, all official of the United States, they said they were shocked?

GELLERMAN: And we'll bring you right up to the third question. You can ask your other two in a second.

The passports. What authority did you have to supersede the consulate in giving out passports, or encouraging them?

RAFIZADEH: I had no authority. In case of someone needs a passport for the sickness, I will ask the consul general to give the passport to him -- it's not to give a passport to him, just to reissue the passport, extend the passport. And we will wire the SAVAK headquarter for decision. We did it.

GELLERMAN: Your last two points, please?

MAN: Well, he asked me a question, sir.

Number one, I don't expect him that he himself call himself a traitor. Of course, that's his right. We leave it to the judgment of the law or morality, if a citizen accept voluntarily the service of a foreign intelligence service.

Number two, I didn't say there were 30,000, 40,000 CIA agents in Iran. I said there were 80,000 Americans, including representatives of CIA in army, in SAVAK, and other places, and they could witness day-to-day what is going on in Iran.

GELLERMAN: But he makes a very powerful, you know argument.

MAN: How he could sit in New York and give better information...

GELLERMAN: It couldn't have been much worse. It couldn't have been much worse than the CIA was giving, you know, giving to their own people. That's for sure. I mean they did blow the whole revolution. Am I right? I mean they just missed the revolution. They took a vacation.

Thanks for your call.

You're on the air.

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WOMAN: I have a very brief comment. I would like to swear to God that this person is a dirty, nasty criminal. I'm very, very, very sorry, really, that you have invited such a jerk, such a dirty criminal for your show. Fred Fiske Show always has been a high-caliber show. And with inviting this nasty, dirty criminal, traitor to humanity, you -- I'm sorry that you are such a nice person, Bruce.

GELLERMAN: Let me ask you a question.

WOMAN: Yes.

GELLERMAN: I understand your emotion. I understand that you have your opinion. But should he not have the ability to state -- I mean the man wrote a book. He has something to state. He says he can back it up. Why do you have to attack him personally in order to make your point?

WOMAN: Sir, because from the first of your show, whoever came to this show, he mis-recruited this person. He's a traitor. He has not even the knowledge of English to write such a book. Be sure that someone else has written this book for him. You don't know how nasty, how a jerk he is.

GELLERMAN: Do you know him?

WOMAN: All the Iranians know him. He's a traitor. He's a thief. He is really a dirty thief.

GELLERMAN: How do all the Iranians know him?

WOMAN: Well, because he was the chief of SAVAK here.

GELLERMAN: Was that well known before the downfall of the Shah?

WOMAN: Yes. All the people know how dirty, how criminal he was.

GELLERMAN: Let me ask him a question. Hang on.

Was your position as the head of SAVAK generally known to the Iranian community in the United States?

RAFIZADEH: Sure.

GELLERMAN: It was?

RAFIZADEH: Sure. Now they're defending the Shah, they are defending SAVAK. But as the chief of SAVAK in the United States, I become dirty.

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GELLERMAN: And before that?

RAFIZADEH: No, no. The remark they're making, the lady is making this remark, that SAVAK was good, Shah was good. But as the chief of SAVAK in the United States, I am dirty.

GELLERMAN: Response?

WOMAN: Sir, let me tell you, in the beginning of the show he said that he is a member of the Toiler Party. Actually, he was Mosafer Bagoli (?), Mosafer Bagoli himself.

GELLERMAN: Who was that?

WOMAN: Well, he knows who was he. He was one of the ex-members of the Parliament. He was, himself, he was against Mossadegh. And he was directed by British people. From the beginning of his life, he was a traitor. And he did -- he really doesn't -- he really doesn't deserve, you know, to waste two hours of your time.

Have you ever gone through his book? Do you know what he has written about his book?

GELLERMAN: Uh-huh.

WOMAN: Have you read the obscene language, obscene language that he has used in his book? Does a writer, does an honest writer write such things that he has written in his book? The personal life of Shah and General [unintelligible], they have been something between themselves.

If he had some, really some -- well, I'm not going to take the side of the Shah. But I'm going to tell you how nasty this person is. And I'm sure that there would be no Iranian throughout the world that if he names -- if they know him, you know what they do with him.

Thank you very much.

GELLERMAN: Thanks for your call.

Let me just ask you before we take the next call. When these people call, and they're your fellow countrymen, they call you nasty and they call you a traitor, doesn't it bother you? I mean...

RAFIZADEH: No.

GELLERMAN: It doesn't bother you?

RAFIZADEH: Honestly, they don't bother me.

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GELLERMAN: Why?

RAFIZADEH: Why should it bother me? Because I'm not nasty, I'm not a traitor. That was my social obligation, what I did. And I wrote a book and I put the record straight what happened in Iran. I wish more people, they will write their experiences, too. And 10 years, 15 years from now, some scholar, they will go through all of this thing, they will write another book for Iran and exactly what went on.

It doesn't bother me, no, because they get very emotional, they don't understand what was going on in the time of the Shah. Still, they don't believe -- they're wishful thinker -- that whatever happened to Iran is because of the Shah. If Shah was a monarch, he will obey the constitution, this thing wouldn't happen to Iran, it even wouldn't happen to United State of America.

Now, they call me traitor, I give intelligence to foreign countries. What foreign countries? These same people are in foreign countries right now.

GELLERMAN: Mansour Rafizadeh: His book is "Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal: An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran."

...We haven't even gotten into the subtitle of your book, which is "An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran." I hope we do take some time for that.

You're on the air.

MAN: My name is Said Jabbar. I'm calling from Los Angeles.

I didn't have a chance to listen to all of Mr. Rafizadeh's comments, but I could hear to some of them through another line to Washington, D.C., through one of my friend's homes. I have a couple of questions to ask to Mr. Rafizadeh.

GELLERMAN: Please.

MAN: ...Okay. One of the questions I have to ask is this: I'm familiar with Mr. Rafizadeh's background, and one of the questions I have to ask is that, where does he get the idea of, at this point of time, seven years after the revolution, to publish a book regarding SAVAK's atrocities, where he himself, at the time when I was a student at the United States, was known among most of us; who were not leftists and were in fact pro-monarchists, but were not involved in SAVAK operations, as one of the most corrupt officials that there was.

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In fact, I remember that at that time, a group of us at the university that we were at formed a group to monitor these people that supposedly worked for the Shah's government and did everything possible to undermine the Shah's government by, for a start, recruiting the most corrupt student elements there ever were, and while reporting on pro-monarchist students that were good students and were trying to study, and in fact trying to defend the regime, but they considered them to be a threat to their own position.

I just do not -- I consider myself and people like myself victims of the likes of Mr. Rafizadeh, who were members of the SAVAK and who actually worked to undermine that regime by misinforming the government, by giving false reports. And there are many people like Mr. Rafizadeh, who are basically corrupt mercenaries, who are today working for the Khomeini government. And I wouldn't be surprised if Mr. Rafizadeh, himself, right now, through these publications and so forth, is in fact working for the Khomeini government.

It is a fact that many SAVAK, former SAVAK officials were in fact, at the time, working to undermine the Shah's regime, and later on worked for the Khomeini government.

GELLERMAN: I had heard that, too.

MAN: Yeah.

GELLERMAN: But your questions are very good ones. Let's get some response.

RAFIZADEH: No, sir, I'm not working for Khomeini government. It was my...

MAN: How do we know that?

RAFIZADEH: I beg your pardon?

MAN: How do we know that?

RAFIZADEH: I'm saying I'm not working for the Khomeini government.

MAN: You've been saying things for years, Mr. Rafizadeh, and most of them have been lies.

GELLERMAN: What proof would you like?

MAN: What proof? You can't prove it. You can't disprove it, either. The point is, that why would a former SAVAK official, in a very, very high place, in charge of the intelligence operations at the embassy in the United States, who had in

fact an extremely corrupt network that we know of, today all of a sudden comes and publishes this book? That's the question.

Secondly, we have also received information, since we still have that monitoring group, that you in fact tried to extort money from the Shah's son before publishing this book.

GELLERMAN: Which monitoring group?

MAN: Well, I can't mention the name.

RAFIZADEH: No, that's not true, sir. At any rate, that was my social obligation, to write the book. Now the follower of the son of the Shah, they don't like me. Khomeini people, they don't like me. CIA doesn't like me.

MAN: Now wait a second. How do we know that Khomeini's people don't like you? You seem to be safe. You seem to be safe enough, as a former SAVAK official, to go around and publish a book and come on talk shows. All the other SAVAK...

RAFIZADEH: So what's wrong with that? That's a free country.

MAN: All the other SAVAK officials that I know that were in as responsible a position as you were today are still in hiding because they're the number one targets of the regime.

RAFIZADEH: Still hiding in the United States?

MAN: A lot of them -- the SAVAK consisted of a lot of good officials and a lot of bad officials. And you present one of the bad ones. In fact, a lot of people like you are still working for that government.

GELLERMAN: But you don't have the proof. That's the point.

MAN: No, but he doesn't -- he can't disprove it.

GELLERMAN: But that's the null hypothesis. You can't disprove nothing. I mean, you know, in science it's called the null hypothesis. And, you know, you must take somebody at his face value unless you have evidence to the contrary. And you don't.

MAN: No, no. I understand. What you're saying is fair. But I mean, you know, for instance...

GELLERMAN: When I ask you what the monitoring group is, you should be able to tell me. I don't think that should be a big secret. That's evidence.

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MAN: Okay. I'll tell you what the name of the monitoring group is. The monitoring group right now functions as a group called Gamah (?). Before, it was another group. It was simply called Iran Focus Group.

GELLERMAN: And they were monitoring SAVAK agents?

MAN: Yes. There were a group of us who were well-placed, our families were well-placed within the previous regime, so we didn't have to worry about repressions because we had other channels of protecting ourselves. And even through some other official embassy members, we were so concerned about the amount of corruption and misinformation that was within the Washington, D.C. intelligence operations of SAVAK, because we could see -- you know, we could see the kind of people they recruited, that we were so concerned that their operations was doing more to undermine the credibility of the Shah's regime than the actual revolutionaries were.

And one of the biggest black marks on the regime of the late Shah is the fact that the Shah was so misinformed and misguided by his own intelligence operations, simply because a lot of these people were doing things to protect their own interests. There were a lot of corrupt people. Mr. Rafizadeh is a prime example of the type of internal corruption that existed.

And when there were other people that tried to actually investigate people like Rafizadeh and make it public, they became victims of SAVAK, of that element of SAVAK.

GELLERMAN: And what happened to them?

MAN: Well, I mean, for instance, I remember even -- I remember they even gave a report against me, for instance. And my father called me from Teheran, really worried that there is a report against you. And I said, "It probably comes from Rafizadeh's office because we're monitoring these guys."

And some of these people that they could get their hands on, you know, were persecuted. Some of them could never go back. Some of them just simply stayed in the United States because there was no future for them anymore.

They engaged in disinformation against these people. They engaged in character assassination. And they're still doing it today. And they're still doing it today.

GELLERMAN: Let me...

MAN: ...Mr. Rafizadeh comes and accuses a young man of 25 that has probably zero kilometer on his political experience,

an accuses him of all kinds of things, there is no way that the person could -- there is no way that the late Shah's son's involvement in political activities could be as extensive as Mr. Rafizadeh says. We know that because we worked with these people.

The only reason Mr. Rafizadeh today has published this book and he's so upset about the late Shah's son is because he did approach these people, he did approach these people, he did try to extort money out of them, and they simply refused.

GELLERMAN: Okay. Let's get some response. Thank you for your call. You made some very powerful points.

Okay. Did you try to extort money from anybody?

RAFIZADEH: No, no. If I would like to money from the son of the Shah -- the CIA offered money. I would take the money from CIA and keep quiet and not to write a book.

GELLERMAN: Did you monitor students in the United States and send that information back to SAVAK in Iran?

RAFIZADEH: I don't know what he means by monitoring. We have agents all over in the United State. And those agents, they were not hired by me here. The agent was sent from Iran.

GELLERMAN: But you were the head office. I mean it was your responsibility to...

RAFIZADEH: Sure, we did monitor. Sure, we did monitor. We did monitor.

GELLERMAN: You did monitor.

RAFIZADEH: Yeah, we did.

GELLERMAN: Did you send back pictures, "This person's a troublemaker. This person's demonstrating. This person..."?

RAFIZADEH: "This person is demonstrating. This one is doing" -- yes.

GELLERMAN: And you did that.

RAFIZADEH: I did that.

GELLERMAN: But, all right. That was part of your job.

RAFIZADEH: That was part of my job. I did it.

GELLERMAN: But where's the social conscience there?

RAFIZADEH: Look, I have another job to do. I'm getting rid of the big dictator. I'm working inside. If those people goes to Iran, nothing will happen to those people. But I'm trying to defeat the big dictator. That was my job.

GELLERMAN: You're on the air.

MAN: Mr. Rafizadeh? First of all, I would like to be the only person to compliment you on this program. You have managed -- you have managed to put filth on this airwaves like no other has managed.

And one last comment. You said that you came to the United States in 1965. Your command of the English language is poor, to say the least.

And for your social obligations, sir, I recommend that you spend more time in the lavatory, where you did in the SAVAK in Iran writing that filth all over the wall. You should stay there, sir, and keep...[caller cut off].

GELLERMAN: Hello. You're on the air.

MAN: Gentlemen, I have three points.

Number one, there is a discrepancy in his statement. He has said that, basically, he's against a monarchy. And I think after a couple of minutes he said, you know, that, okay, if people brings the Regent back, then of course that is acceptable. Basically, if he's against that philosophy of the monarchy, he should be against -- either people like them or otherwise, you know. That is something incredible.

GELLERMAN: Like who? Against who?

MAN: You said that you are against monarchy. Right?

GELLERMAN: He's saying that you're against the monarchy.

RAFIZADEH: I am against the monarchy. I am against dictatorship.

MAN: No, but you have said that if the son of Shah goes back, that, of course, if people like him, that is appreciable. If you are against...

RAFIZADEH: If the son of the Shah goes back, if the people, they like him, fine with me. I have nothing to do with that.

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MAN: No, but it means you are some sort of a fickle-minded person, that you are saying that -- it means that you don't have some sort of basic philosophy. Either the majority of the people like that, or otherwise, if you are basically against that, you should be against that, as I am against monarchy.

GELLERMAN: But that's not true. I mean if you were against Ronald Reagan in the last election, it doesn't mean you leave the country. It means you, you know, you support the basic tenets in the Constitution, and you go on to the next election and you live here. I mean what's the point?

MAN: My point is that he says that he's against monarchy, but again he's supporting the monarchy. That is incredible.

And secondly, that he says that nobody believes in double agents. You know, that is another irony. And it's hardly -- I think though people hate him, but his book is, I believe, very popular and many people are purchasing him, and that is good sales. And I believe that is a very successful business in this regard.

GELLERMAN: Thanks for your call.

...You're on the air.

WOMAN: ...May I ask Mr. Rafizadeh, what is his position? Is he a patriot?

GELLERMAN: A patriot?

WOMAN: Yes, a patriot, or whatever. He wants to make himself a hero? I think -- I really congratulate him because I think no businessman in the whole United States could have such a publicity for himself. He made a lot of money in this book. And yet, what is his position? If he says that he's a democrat, what he's doing now for -- let's talk about now. Let's forget about the past. Presume that everything was wrong in the past. What he's doing now to prevent [sic] his country and to be constructive for his country? Nothing. He is just sitting.

GELLERMAN: Hold it. You ask a question, then you answer it. Not fair. Let's get a response.

WOMAN: Okay. I'm waiting for a response.

RAFIZADEH: Okay. Would you read the last hundred pages in my book?

WOMAN: Yes.

RAFIZADEH: What I wrote about Khomeini, the arms scandal, what I said about President Reagan?

WOMAN: Okay.

GELLERMAN: Have you read the book?

WOMAN: Yes, I did.

GELLERMAN: How do you respond to his question?

WOMAN: Okay. I do respond that if he's such a patriot and he wants to have -- his dream is to have the democracy in Iran, why's he sitting on his ass in New York instead of going back to Iran and fight with the other ones and do something constructive?

GELLERMAN: But that can be said about any Iranian in the United States who opposes Khomeini, can't it?

WOMAN: Well, I mean the way he put it.

And another question I have. Why he didn't bring up all these questions when the late Shah was alive and the rest of the people that he's telling that they were, you know, bad people and he's accusing all these people? Why he didn't bring all these questions when they were alive? It's very easy when a person has died, then you just accuse them, because they cannot prove anything when they are not here.

GELLERMAN: Let's get a response.

RAFIZADEH: I couldn't do it when the Shah was alive. My life was in danger.

And besides that, you said all those people died [unintelligible]. He still reads about dead people. And many of those facts that are in the book, I learned some of them after the Shah left the country.

GELLERMAN: Where's the evidence that will substantiate the larger charges, those things that you say in the book? Are there people that are alive that can substantiate that?

RAFIZADEH: Well, sure, they're alive. There are most charges against CIA. The CIA is alive. Most charges is against U.S. Government. It's alive.

GELLERMAN: Do you have documents that can prove some of these charges?

RAFIZADEH: Sure, I have documents.

GELLERMAN: I wish you'd brought them.

You're on the air. Thank you for waiting.

MAN: My first question is, at the same time that Mr. Rafizadeh was the head of the SAVAK in the United States, there was a movement in this country and other countries in Europe for a more democratic Iran. Why didn't he abandon SAVAK and join this movement? That would be my first question.

GELLERMAN: Okay. Let's get a response to that.

RAFIZADEH: I don't know what kind of movement you are talking. What was that movement was called? I don't know what you are talking about the movement.

And beside that, it doesn't happen I agree with your movement, or any other movement, they call them democratic.

MAN: It was a well-known fact that amongst all the students and intellectuals in this country and Europe were an absolute movement for a better government in Iran because the government of the Shah was a very corrupt government and was killing and torturing and oppressing the masses and people in Iran.

GELLERMAN: I don't think you'll get an argument to that.

MAN: And this was the belief of many intellectuals who lived in Iran and outside. I, myself, was one of the students who could not go back to Iran for five years because my name had been reported by likes of Mr. Rafizadeh to the Iranian government and the SAVAK, which was the most hated secret police in the world. And if he was such a democratic person, instead of reporting the names of people like me, he should have joined such movements. But instead...

RAFIZADEH: Okay. Would you tell me what happened to that movement, finally?

MAN: That movement still exists. We are still fighting for a democratic government in Iran.

RAFIZADEH: Good. I wish them best luck. And I [unintelligible] them.

MAN: This movement will never die. As long as intellectuals who are democratic and freedom lovers exist all over the world, this movement will always exist. And eventually we will get to that point. But the fact is, people like you do not make

this transition easy at all; and not even that, but makes it extremely difficult.

I know of my friends, very young, who were thrown in jail because of having only one book and a piece of literature, and they were tortured for three years, with absolutely no trial. And this was all done by the secret police and the SAVAK and the Shah's regime.

RAFIZADEH: I agree with you a hundred percent with all those things. That's what I'm trying to say. I was trying to stop it.

MAN: Well, the way you were doing it doesn't seem terribly logical to me. If you actually...

RAFIZADEH: Because it doesn't look logical to you, it doesn't mean it was not logical to me.

MAN: Well, what I'm saying is...

RAFIZADEH: I'm not dictating to anyone what to say, what do do. All I did, Gentleman, I wrote a book what I witnessed in my life. That's all.

MAN: Well, I'm not arguing with you, because there were a lot of people like you -- unfortunately, too many -- and not enough people who were actually trying to make a good transition from this dictator government to a more democratic [one]. And the reason...

RAFIZADEH: That's what they were trying to do. That's what I said at the beginning. I was against the revolution. We want to have a transitional government. We want to have a monarchy at the beginning. According to constitution, it didn't happen like that.

GELLERMAN: Thanks for your call....

You're on the air.

WOMAN: Bruce, I wanted to ask you a question, first of all. I've been listening to your program from the beginning. I have never heard of this guy before, Mr. Rafizadeh. What do you think about him, yourself? I mean it seems like everybody has discredited him so far. What do you think about him, yourself?

GELLERMAN: I read about two-thirds of the book this afternoon. I believe that he's sincere. I wish I saw some more proof of what he's saying. Some of the charges -- a lot of it's anecdotal. I would have liked to have gotten into some of the

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material that I really am familiar with, and that is the arms deal and Mr. Reagan, and so on. So, a lot of the material that's going on now is simply beyond my fund of knowledge.

I do believe that he's sincere, and I think he's held up pretty well under pressure.

WOMAN: Okay. Well, he didn't answer, for example, one of the questions that a caller asked him about why is he writing the book right now. I mean...

RAFIZADEH: Okay, let me -- I answered your question, young lady.

WOMAN: No, I haven't called. This is the first time I'm calling.

RAFIZADEH: Okay. I start to write this book four years ago. It took me four years to write this book. One year, the book was in the hands of publishing house. And one year, I also fight with Justice Department and CIA. So it took me four years to write this book, and it happen it's published this time. I didn't write the book just two weeks ago.

GELLERMAN: We're going to try to fit in one more call.....

WOMAN: ...May I make a suggestion to you? Do you think you should collaborate with Jackie Collins for your next book? Because you seem to have such a vivid imagination.

RAFIZADEH: Thank you. Thank you very much.

WOMAN: I'm sure she could learn a lot of things from you.

RAFIZADEH: Thank you very much. Thank you.

GELLERMAN: Mansour Rafizadeh, thank you for showing up. I appreciate it.

RAFIZADEH: Thank you. Thank you very much.

GELLERMAN: The book is "Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal: An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran."

You showed great poise under a tremendous amount of pressure and tension, I think.

Thank you. I appreciate it.